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 Abstract
The paper analyses data on wages, employment and labour composition in the Uruguayan
manufacturing sector during 1985-1999 in order to get some evidence on the effects of union
action on these variables. The whole period is first studied using a model in which no
assumptions on the underlying bargaining model are made. The results support the
hypothesis of two different bargaining frameworks in the 80s and 90s. Therefore, a right-to-
manage bargaining model is specified for the 80s and a recursive contracts model for the 90s.
Union effects are such that while in the 80s the effect of trade unions were to increase wages
and hence decrease employment, in the nineties they moderated wage demands in exchange
of more job stability. They not only managed to have a positive direct effect on employment
but also to buffer the negative effects of increased openness and demand fluctuations on
employment. The existence of unions also had an impact on labour composition, favouring a
higher share of non-production workers in total employment. The result can be linked to the
fact that firms moved to more capital intensive – or at least more skilled labour intensive-
technologies to avoid union costs. A final finding is related to the fact that the change in the
Uruguayan bargaining regime at the beginning of the 90s – by which the mandatory
extension of contracts vanished – favoured a more decentralised negotiation scheme and thus
ended with the homogenous impact found in the 80s, since coordination in bargaining was
lost.
Resumen
El trabajo utiliza datos sobre salarios, empleo y composición de la mano de obra parta el
sector manufacturero uruguayo 1985-1999 de forma de buscar evidencia sobre los efectos de
los sindicatos sobre estas variables. Primero se analiza el período completo sin hacer ningún
supuesto sobre el modelo de negociación subyacente. Los resultados apoyan la hipótesis de la
existencia de dos modelos diferentes en los 80s y 90s. Por lo tanto se especifica un modelo
‘right-to-manage‘ en los 80s y un modelo de contratos recursivos en los 90s. Los efectos de
los sindicatos fueron tales que en la primer década aumentaron salarios y disminuyeron
empleo, mientras en la segunda moderaron sus demandas salariales a cambio de mayor
estabilidad laboral. No sólo lograron tener un efecto directo positivo sobre el empleo en
algunas industrias sino que también pudieron suavizar los efectos negativos de la apertura
comercial y de las fluctuaciones de la demanda. La existencia de sindicatos tuvo también un
efecto sobre la composición de la mano de obra, favoreciendo un uso relativamente mayor de
empleados en el total. El resultado puede asociarse al hecho que las empresas se movieron
hacia tecnología más intensivas en capital – o al menos en trabajo calificado – como forma de
evitar algunos de los costos asociados a la acción sindical. Un último hallazgo se refiere al
hecho que el cambio en el esquema de negociación ocurrido a comienzos de los 90s – por el
que los contratos dejaron de ser homologados – favoreció la negociación descentralizada y,
de esta forma, terminó con los efectos homogéneos entre industrias de la acción sindical al
desvanecerse la alta coordinación de la negociación observada en los 80s.Introduction
Previous work on the impact of labour market institutions has shown the significance of
unionisation relative to other institutional constraints in order to understand the relevant
sources of rigidities in employment, mobility and performance of the Uruguayan labour
markets (Cassoni et al., 1995). The response of wages to macroeconomic conditions has also
been examined at the macro level concluding that the observed compression and lower
response are the consequences of the resumption of collective bargaining (Cassoni et al.,
1996).
The analysis for the period 1975-1997 has shown the impact of different institutional and
labour relations settings on wages and employment, in a period where unions were banned
(1973-84), when they were legalised and there was tripartite bargaining at the industry level
with mandatory extension to all firms within the sector (1985-1991), and finally when there
was an increased decentralisation and firm-specific bargaining with no enforceability of
contracts (starting institutionally in 1992, but observed in 1993). The effects on wages and
labour demand were examined for these different periods and the main findings indicate:
-  Unions were able to successfully negotiate higher wages for blue-collar workers in the
period 1985-1991, with an elasticity of 0.15, calculated at the mean value of union
density. As a result, while employment fell, unions were able to protect against job
loss by reducing wage elasticities from 0.69 (1973-84) to 0.22 (1985-97). This is
concluded after characterising the bargaining framework as a 'right-to-manage' model
(Nickell, 1982), which implies that there is no bargaining over employment
-  The employment-output elasticity fell by more than 50 percent, from 0.83 to 0.31
-  Significantly, no evidence was found indicating that the return of bargaining
lengthened the amount of time needed for employment to adjust
Starting in 1992, there was a change in the bargaining system, with the Government
abandoning the tripartite negotiation and relaxing the enforcement of collective agreements at
the industry level.  At the same time, lower tariffs became actually binding constraints around
1993-94, increasing the exposure of firms to international and regional competition in the
Mercosur. As a result, it was observed that some collective agreements explicitly consideredemployment as part of the negotiations, suggesting that there was a change in the union
objective function and the bargaining model to be considered. Using the same 'right-to-
manage' model for the whole period, the main results found for blue-collar workers were:
-  The union wage differential for blue-collar workers vanished in 1993 in some industries
-  Labour demand shifted to the left
-  Openness at the industry level has an impact on the wage differential, reducing it
The number of temporal observations when that research was done was scarce to compare the
different regimes so as to provide a complete 'statistical experiment'. If bargaining over
employment started being a common practice after 1993, it might be the case that the
impossibility of correctly modelling the new setting stemmed from having observation for
only 4 years. Further, no data on non-production workers were available before 1983, so that
the models before and after 1985 could only be estimated for production workers. Finally,
external shocks and their effects on the bargaining outcome were introduced in a very simple
form without differentiating the export and the import substitutive sectors.
This study tries to go beyond the previous work and examine if it is possible to model the
outcome of bargaining using different models depending on the time period. If decentralised
bargaining started being a generalised practice in the second half of the nineties and job
stability clauses were found in those collective agreements, then the right-to-manage model
would not be an adequate instrument to analyse wages and employment in that sub-period.
Further, data availability allows one to model the union effects on labour demand for both
white and blue-collar workers. The distinction is important, especially in the nineties in
Uruguay, as the change in the competitive pressure faced by manufacturing firms could have
forced them to change the employment mix they used. Finally, it is here intended to model
the effects of openness depending on them being changing import or export shares in the
industry, since the nineties was a period of substantial variation in the external conditions
with non-negligible effects in the different manufacturing sectors.
The impact of unionisation on employment levels, speed of adjustment and wage differentials
for white and blue-collar workers is thus analysed using a pooled cross-section time-series of
manufacturing industries during 1985-1999. The available collective agreements point at a
right-to-manage model as the adequate instrument to study wages and employment before
1993, while an efficient or recursive model would be suitable after that date. However, inorder to also have empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis, a model for the whole
period is proposed. The paper first develops the theoretical models to be used. After
describing the data, the results of estimation are summarised. The final section concludes.
Theoretical and empirical models
Union behaviour has been modelled either using the monopoly union model, assuming that
unions have the power to impose their preferred wage policy on the firm, which then
determines employment from its labour demand curve (see references in Pencavel, 1991) or
using a bargaining model. The conceptual issues that bargaining models pose are related to:
1.  What do the parties bargain over - wages, employment, other issues?
2.  What are the union preferences or objective function?
3.  Is bargaining a sequential process -taking place over wages first and then over
labour- or is it done over wages and employment at the same time?
A  right-to-manage model must be specified whenever the level of employment is unilaterally
decided at the firm after wages have been bargained over. This model is particularly
appealing when negotiations over wages take place at the industry level, since it is difficult
that the level of employment can be bargained at that level –at least at the same time- fitting
the Uruguayan case for the period until 1993. On the other hand, when bargaining takes place
at the firm level and employment stability is explicitly included in the bargaining agenda, a
recursive or efficient contracts model is more adequate. Thus, from a theoretical point of
view one should analyse the Uruguayan experience specifying two different bargaining
models depending on the time period.
The analysis of the contents of a high proportion of the collective agreements signed along
1985-1999 also supports the hypothesis. If there was any negotiation on employment in the
first sub-period, this was likely to have taken place at the firm level, after bargaining over the
wage. However, these arrangements, if they existed, were not subject to observation. In the
nineties, on the other hand, many contracts did include job stability clauses, mechanisms to
rotate in the unemployment insurance system; agreed ways of introducing new technologies.
Further, a especial purpose survey carried out in 1996 also reveals workers in many firmswere covered by firm-level agreements and that employment clauses were included in them
1.
While 52% of firms did not have any sort of collective agreements, workers in 7% of them
were covered by both firm and industry level contracts. On the other hand, 15% of firms had
only signed firm-level agreements with their workers, the percentage increasing to 23% if
large firms only are considered. Clauses related to employment are found in 15% of those
firms with firm-level collective agreements.
In spite of all of the above supporting the use of different bargaining models, indirect
empirical evidence on the appropriateness of them is also here analysed. Following the
strategy proposed by Boal and Pencavel (1994), a model for the whole period is firstly
estimated, avoiding the specification of a bargaining model and just including union effects
on both the wage and the labour demand equations.
The model for the whole period: 1985-1999
The main assumption used by Boal and Pencavel (1994) is that both union and non-union
firms define employment and wages using the same functional form, but possibly with
different parameters. In order to do so, they specify a wage and a labour demand equation
including a binary variable that is equal to 1 if workers in the firm are unionised and zero
otherwise, that in turn interacts with all the parameters. Statistical significance of the
interactions is taken as evidence of direct influence of unions on wages and employment. On
the other hand, if the coefficients were statistically equal to zero in the model for employment
and different from zero in those for the wage, then unions would have an impact on
employment only indirectly, via  the wage elasticity of labour demand. Wage and
employment gaps are afterwards calculated using the estimated parameters of the model.
It has been widely demonstrated by now that these statistical tests cannot be conclusive. Thus
the exercise only attempts to find further support for the specification of two different
bargaining models in the Uruguayan case. The inclusion/exclusion of variables such as the
alternative wage or union density in the employment equation need not be incompatible with a
right-to-manage model (see for example the discussions done on the subject by Pencavel, 1991;
                                                
1 The Survey 'Strategies and employment policy of manufacturing firms' was carried out by the
Department of Economics at the Social Sciences Faculty of the University of Uruguay. The sample
used was very similar to that used by those generating official statistics, so that its results are
consistent with the data here analysed.or Booth, 1995). Further, Carruth and Oswald (1987) and Oswald (1993) have demonstrated
that the contract curve may lie on the labour demand curve under certain circumstances.
Let L be total employment, which in turn is divided in production and non-production
workers (Lp  and Lnp, respectively). A standard labour demand function would have
employment dependant on output (q) and the price of labour (w) relative to the product price
(pp), while the distribution of jobs among production and non-production workers will
depend on their relative wages (wp - wnp), which can be expressed in natural logs as:
   L  =  β 0 + β 1(w-pp) + β 2q   (1)
Lnp - Lp = β 3 + β 4(wnp- wp)( 2 )
Labour supply, on the other hand, depends on the wage level relative to the price of
consumption goods (cp) and on the reservation wage (w
r):
L  =  α 0 + α 1(w-cp) + α 2(w
r-cp) (3)
Solving for the wage using equations (1) and (3) the wage equation in logs is:
w-pp  =  γ 0 + γ 1(pp-cp) +γ 2(w
r-cp) (4)
The parameters defining the above equations however could be different depending on the
extent of unionisation; the structure of bargaining; and/or union bargaining power. Further,
the equations themselves may include other variables that would account for market
conditions and observable characteristics of the industrial sectors (X). Hence, the system can
be restated as:
L  =  (b00 + b01U) + (b10 + b11U)(w-pp) + (b20 + b21U)q  + (b30 + b31U)X (5)
Lnp - Lp = (b40 + b41U) + (b50 + b51U)(wnp- wp) + (b60 + b61U)X (6)
w-pp = (b70+b71U) + (b80+b81U)(pp-cp) + (b90+b91U)(w
r-cp)+(b100 + b101U)X (7)U reflects union effects, so that statistically insignificant coefficients for the union variables
in equations (5) and (6) would imply they have no direct effect on employment and/or the
employment composition.
Given the institutional changes that took place at the beginning of the nineties, interactions
with temporal binary variables will also be included in order to study the existence of
changes in the underlying bargaining models in the early nineties.
There are not non-union industries in Uruguay since 1985. However, the extent of
unionisation does vary by industry and in time. Hence, wage gaps can be easily calculated
following Boal and Pencavel’s methodology with slight modifications. First, the different
gaps (employment, employment composition, and wage) have to be calculated at the mean
value of union  (UM) for each industry. Second, it has to be assumed that there are no
differences in all variables, except for the wage and the employment mix, between union and
non-union sectors
2. The gaps are defined according to:
∆ L  = b01UM + b11UM (w-pp)NU + (b10 + b11UM)∆ (w-pp) + b21UMq  + b31UMX
∆ Lnp/p  = b41UM + b51UM (wnp-wp) + b61UMX
∆ w  = b71UM + b81UM (pp-cp) + b91UM (w
r-cp) + b101UMX
The model for the first sub-period: 1985-1991
The model postulated for the first sub-period implies that in a first stage employers and
workers bargain over the wage level. Once the wage is set, the firm decides the level of
employment according to its labour demand function. Firms are assumed to use a technology
with two inputs, capital and labour. Maximisation of profits thus yields a two-equations
system of derived demands, given the price of inputs and other observable characteristics of
the industries and the markets they operate in. Labour is not homogeneous and can be
classified in two categories: according to the worker being directly involved in production or
not (production and non-production workers). Hence, given total employment, the adequatemix between blue and white-collar workers is decided depending on the relative wage of both
categories. In bargaining, unions do not differentiate among production and non-production
workers but negotiate a common wage increase for all workers. However, relative wages may
change, as managers may prefer to increase them above the minimum set at the negotiation
table. Further, they might also substitute one type of worker by the other depending on the
characteristics of the market the firm operates in or the external shocks that take place. These
effects are included in the relative demand for production and non-production workers.
Therefore, the estimable model, with variables measured in natural logs, is:
K =  α 0 + α 1(pc-pp) + α 2q + α 3X (8)
L  =  β 0 + β 1(w-pp) + β 2q + β 3X (9)
Lnp - Lp = β 4 + β 5(wnp - wp) + β 6X (10)
Where K accounts for capital services; q is value added; L is total employment; Lnp refers to
non-production workers; Lp refers to production workers; X is a vector of variables
accounting for market conditions; while (pc-pp), (w-pp), (wnp-pp) and (wp-pp) are the prices
of capital services, labour, non-production and production workers, respectively, relative to
the product price, pp.
The utility function of unions is derived form a median voter framework, assuming that they
maximise a surplus over an alternative income w
a. Union members care about the real wage
in terms of the consumption price index. The alternative income is linked to average earnings
in the informal sector, average unemployment benefits and wages in other industries in the
previous time period. The utility function of unions is, thus:
Γ (w, w
a, cp, cp-1, L)  = [(w/cp) – (w
a/cp)-1)]L
φ
Where cp is the consumption price and φ  is a parameter reflecting the weight given to
employment in the union utility function
3. The generalized Nash bargaining can be stated as:
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Non-union wages are union wages minus the estimated wage gap: (w-pp)NU= (w-pp)U - ∆ w. The
composition of the labour input for non-union sectors is calculated analogously.
3The relevant measure for the alternative wage refers to the time period prior to bargaining. Thus, it
has to be deflated by the consumption price index of that same period (cp-1).Max Υ  = (Γ -Γ 0)
α  (Π -Π 0)
1-α
 w
s. to  L = L
*
Where  Γ  and Π  are the utility functions of unions and employers, respectively; L
* is the
optimum level of employment as determined by equation (9); Γ 0  and  Π 0 are the fall-back
positions of each player, which are assumed to be zero; and α  is the bargaining power of unions.
Subject to the assumption that the capital level is given, once bargaining over the wage and
labour demand occur, the solution to the Nash bargain yields an equation for the average wage
level as follows:
(w/pp)
* = η (X,U, φ )f[(w
a/cp)-1, pp/cp)]     (11)
Where η (X,U,φ ), the mark-up over the alternative income, is a function of the bargaining
power of the union, which in turn depends on market conditions (X) such as the exposure of
firms to competition or the occurrence of external shocks; the union’s affiliation rate and the
extent of firm-level bargaining as measures of union strength (U). It also depends on the
weight given to employment in the union objective function (φ ). The assumed changes in the
mark-up when these variables and parameters vary are:
∂η /∂α  > 0    ∂α /∂ U > 0      ∂α /∂ X ≤  0   so that:
∂η /∂ U > 0    ∂η /∂ X ≤  0     ∂η /∂φ  ≥  0
Given unions care about the real wage in terms of consumption goods while firms are
interested in the cost of labour relative to the price of their products, the wedge between those
two prices will also enter the wage equation. No data on capital services are available. Thus,
the model to be estimated over the 1985-1991 sub-period is the 3-equations system (9) to
(11). The exclusion of equation (8), however, will generate simultaneity bias of unknown size
4.
The model for the second sub-period: 1992-1999
The evidence stemming from the collective agreements signed in the 1992-1999 sub-period
shows bargaining also took place over employment. One specification that takes this fact into
account is the recursive contracts model. The generalized Nash bargain is stated as:Max Υ  = (Γ -Γ 0)
 α  (Π -Π 0)
1-α
     w
s.to  L= L
*
Where L
*  is determined according to:
Max Z = (Γ -Γ 0)
 β  (Π -Π 0)
1-β
     L
The parameters α  and β  reflect the bargaining power of the union in wage and employment
negotiations respectively. They are here assumed to be a function of union density and the
structure of bargaining (the extent of coverage of firm-level agreements).
Solving the maximisation problem yields the following system of equations:
L  = f[(w-pp), (w
a-cp)-1, (pp-cp),q, X,U,φ ]   (12)
w-pp = g(X,U,φ ,(w
a-cp)-1, (pp-cp)] (13)
Lnp -Lp = h[X,U,(wnp-wp)] (14)
The employment level will be on the contract curve whenever the bargaining power of unions
when negotiating wages and employment is the same. It will be nearest to its value according
to the labour demand function the lowest the union bargaining power over employment (β ).
The effect of union density on bargaining power in both stages is positive and that of external
conditions negative as before. However, increases in α  and β  will not necessarily generate
increases in wages and employment (Manning, 1987). It all depends on the differences
between them and also on the weight given to employment in the union objective function.
On the other hand, the more the concern of unions about job stability, the lower the wage
level and the higher the employment level bargained. Given the assumed utility functions, the
following can be stated:
1.  ∂ w
*/∂α  unknown, depending on relative size of  α  and  φ
2.  ∂ L
*/∂α  unknown, given ∂ w
*/∂α  is so
                                                                                                                                                       
4  Since a variable accounting for the difference between product and consumption prices is included,
and product prices partially incorporate the price of capital, the biases are expected to be small.3.  ∂ w
*/∂β  = 0      ∂ w
*/∂φ  < 0
4.  ∂ L
*/∂β  > 0      ∂ L
*/∂φ  > 0
Special care has to be taken regarding some specific issues in estimating the above models.
First, endogeneity of output has already been proved in previous research for the Uruguayan
manufacturing sector, so the variable has to be properly instrumented. Some of the variables
that model external shocks for each industry might be endogenous too, as is the case of
import penetration or export share. Second, the models specified impose that parameters are
the same for the six manufacturing industries and in time. The restrictions are strong and thus
should be thoroughly tested for.
The data
The units of observation are the 2-digit manufacturing industries along 1985-1999, on a
quarterly basis. Only six out of eight are used, due to data availability in the period 1985-
1999: food, beverage & tobacco; textiles & leather; paper; chemicals & oil products; non-
metallic minerals; and metal products. Descriptive statistics of the variables involved are
shown in Table 7.1 below.






















0.3322 0.0534 0.2450 0.3957 0.9321 0.6530 0.8100 Total Manufacturing
(0.171) (0.093) (0.034) (0.126) (0.244) (0.142) (0.188)
0.3401 0.0482 0.2564 0.0934 0.9066 0.6530 0.8100 Food, Beverage &
Tobacco (0.096) (0.070) (0.038) (0.050) (0.238) (0.142) (0.188)
0.3314 0.0403 0.567) 0.3615 0.9540 0.6530 0.8100 Textiles &
Leather (0.160) (0.060) (0.095) (0.217) (0.303) (0.142) (0.188)
0.3230 0.1069 0.0991 0.2685 0.8870 0.6530 0.8100 Paper
(0.059) (0.100) (0.035) (0.097) (0.171) (0.142) (0.188)
0.5772 0.0265 0.1216 0.4082 0.9781 0.6530 0.8100
Chemicals & oil (0.055) (0.027) (0.061) (0.115) (0.259) (0.142) (0.188)
0.1377 0.0937 0.1340 0.2775 0.8342 0.6530 0.8100 Non-metallic minerals
(0.088) (0.159) (0.035) (0.124) (0.281) (0.142) (0.188)
0.2837 0.0048 0.0854 0.7443 1.0328 0.6530 0.8100 Metal products














wedge GDP4.2010 0.4820 2.2334 -0.2132 1.8199 -0.0974 1.3432 Total Manufacturing
(0.313) (0.158) (0.157) (0.057) (0.040) (0103) (0.353)
4.6404 0.4901 2.1623 -0.2125 1.8101 -0.0561 1.8040 Food, Beverage &
Tobacco (0.064) (0.048) (0.099) (0.021) (0.029) (0.059) (0.056)
4.4987 0.7308 2.1353 -0.2899 1.7878 -0.1232 1.4748 Textiles &
Leather (0.153) (0.042) (0.113) (0.034) (0.031) (0.121) (0.088)
3.9317 0.3262 2.300 -0.1396 1.8312 -0.1208 1.0033 Paper
(0.081) (0.044) (0.141) (0.033) (0.034) (0.084) (0.053)
4.1610 0.2829 2.413 -0.2026 1.8691 -0.1051 1.6645
Chemicals & oil (0.095) (0.040) (0.768) (0.022) (0.034) (0.116) (0.088)
3.7905 0.5691 2.1708 -0.2420 1.8130 -0.0596 0.8391 Non-metallic minerals
(0.091) (0.082) (0.109) (0.037) (0.026) (0.094) (0.071)
4.1875 0.4929 2.2181 -0.1927 1.8079 -0.1200 1.2734 Metal products
(0.107) (0.040) (0.111) (0.049) (0.029) (0.110) (0.113)
Notes: Mean values are reported, with standard deviation in brackets below. Variables in logs are
employment, wages, relative wages blue/white-collar workers, alternative wage, price wedge
(production/consumption price indexes) and GDP. All other variables are percentages.
Sources: National Institute of Statistics; Central Bank of Uruguay; Customs Office.
The estimated models use data on output, number of workers –production and non-
production workers- and wages that stem from the Quarterly and Annual Industrial Surveys
(National Institute of Statistics-INE). The Quarterly Survey publishes indexes while yearly
the Annual Survey reports values. Both sources are used to build quarterly time series of
values for the above variables, referring to monthly values calculated as an average on a
quarterly basis. Data on product prices refer to the PPI at the 2-digit level (INE).
A cost of labour variable is used instead of wages. It is built adding all non-wage costs –
legal and bargained - to the wage. Data on non-wage costs were taken from Picardo et al.
(1997) and from Cassoni and Ferre (1997). Information on bargained non-wage costs stem
from the manufacturing collective agreements signed between 1985 and 1999.
Union density is defined as the affiliation rate, by industry. The time series is built using data
on membership reported by the central union (PIT-CNT) in each congress and of total
employment (production and non-production workers). These congresses took place in 1985,
1987, 1990, 1993 and 1996-97. No data on membership are available by occupational
category. Thus, it is not possible to calculate union density for production and non-
production workers separately.External shocks are measured as the relative exposure of the industry to foreign competition
both locally and internationally. Two types are here considered trying to differentiate overall
external shocks from those specific to each 2-digit industry. Overall openness has been
proxied in the literature using various indicators. There are two broad categories that refer
either to the economic results or to the direct incidence of trade policy. Among the former
group there is still another classification: measures accounting for the results of trade
liberalisation on the amount of production subject to trade; and those reflecting the level of
price distortion. A known criticism that has to be overcome if indicators based on quantities
are used is that related to not measuring quantities in constant prices, as the variations in the
relative price of tradables/non-tradables would distort the real index. Secondly, the relative
size of the tradable sector will also generate biases (Low, Olarreaga and Suarez, 1999). One
of the most popular indicators for degree of openness based on price distortions is the ratio of
the local price of tradables relative to the international price (Dollar index). However, its use
has been extensively criticised as it reflects at the same time other phenomena related to the
trade policy being export or import oriented (Rodrik and Rodriguez, 1999). Berlinski (2000)
proposed an alternative measure based on the relative prices between export and import
substitutive sectors in an economy. These in turn depend on the international price and the
exchange rate, as well as on the local trade policy.  The trade policy measure includes both
taxes and other protection barriers, so that all sources of distortions are included in the
indicator. Vaillant (2000) has calculated the time series of the implicit 'equivalent tariff' for
Uruguay and shown that its evolution is very similar to the indicators of openness based on
quantities following the methodology as proposed by Low et al. (1999)
5.
Regarding industry-specific external shocks the indicator based on quantities is defined as the
ratio of imports plus exports over gross production in constant prices. Alternatively, one
could try to measure separately the impact of increases in exports and in imports on the
performance of the different firms. Two variables can be built: the share of exports in total
sales and the share of imports in total consumption, generally known as import penetration.
Consumption of goods should include both national and foreign goods, so that it is defined as
GDP minus exports plus imports. An indicator based on relative prices is also built. It is
defined as the ratio of local relative prices times the exchange rate to international relative
                                                




*NT) t, that is local tradable to non-
tradables prices divided by international relative prices, and this in turn equals the tariff in the base
year divided by the tariff in 't', the 'equivalent' tariff τ t  is equal to [(1+τ 0)/rpt ]-1 .prices. Relative prices are the production price of goods (PPI) of each sector divided by an
implicit deflator of non-tradables goods (goods from all sectors except manufacturing,
fishing, agriculture and leverage).
The bargaining models to be used assume that unions negotiate to get the highest possible mark-
up over an alternative wage. This alternative wage can also be thought of as the opportunity cost
of working or reservation wage if no bargaining model is assumed. The alternative income is
defined as the weighted average of what the worker would earn if hired in the manufacturing
sector in order to account for his/her specific skills (which is proxied by the average wage in
manufacturing excluding that of the specific sector); the income the worker would receive if
he/she becomes unemployed and collects unemployment benefits (50% of his/her last wage
received); and the average income of self-employed individuals, under the assumption that if the
worker cannot find a job in the formal sector, he/she would prefer to undertake an informal job
instead of remaining unemployed. The latter is calculated using information from the Household
Survey, as well as the weights, that are being defined as the annual frequency of each category.
The relevant measure to be considered when bargaining takes place is not the current alternative
income, which is further not known, but that prevailing in the previous time period.
Results for the whole period
Equations (5) to (7) were estimated by the method of Instrumental Variables using PcGive
(1998). Given that the structure of bargaining changed in 1992, temporal stability of the
parameters was tested for and resulted statistically significant in many cases. Differences by
industry were also found in the parameter measuring direct union effects. Fixed effects by
industry were included. Further, fixed effects were found to vary at the beginning of the
nineties in the equation describing employment composition, so they were accounted for
using dummy variables.
Regarding the variables included to model specific characteristics of the industries, the
indicators of overall and sectoral degree of openness based on prices above described were
used for the sake of simplicity, given the aim of this exercise. The strategy implies that no
difference is here analysed between the effects of competitive pressure in local and
international markets. The wage equation includes the employment mix as a predetermined
variable so as to account for possible differences in the average wage due to labour
composition (white-collars earn generally more than twice the wage of blue-collars).The models were initially estimated allowing for 4 lags of each variable and were afterwards
reduced sequentially. Table A.1 in the appendix summarises the results of estimation for the
three equations while Table 7.2 displays the results relative to the existence of union effects.
No union direct effects are found on employment or on the composition of employment up to
1993. Further, coefficients for all variables interacting with union density are statistically
zero. However, after 1993 some of them are found to be statistically significant. Further,
there is evidence of unions having an indirect effect on employment via reducing the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour since 1993. Regarding the wage equation
union effects, both direct and indirect, are found to be present all along the period, but
changes are also found at the beginning of the nineties.







Union density -0.0265  (0.170)  7.2961  (3.248) -0.4293  (0.319)
Industry 31 * Union -0.4749  (0.285) 0.1733  (0.138) _____
Industry 32 * Union  0.0178  (0.078) 1.2924  (0.566) _____
Industry 34 * Union -0.0166  (0.113) -1.4731  (0.583) _____
Industry 35 * Union -0.0973  (0.143) -0.7833  (0.417) _____
Industry 36 * Union -0.1289  (0.102)  0.4738  (0.225) _____
Relative wage blue-white * Union -0.5802  (0.409) _____ _____
Wedge * Union _____ -0.0615  (0.556) _____
Wedge 4 lags * Union _____ -0.5609  (0.352) _____
Alternative wage * Union _____ -2.2747  (1.141) _____
Employment composition * Union _____ -5.2711  (2.273) _____
Product demand * Union _____ _____ -0.0400  (0.055)
Wage level * Union _____ _____ 0.1483  (0.128)
Rel. prices Uruguay/Rest World * Union -0.0097  (0.101)  0.0206  (0.211) 0.0614  (0.042)
Equivalent tariff  * Union -0.1430  (0.113) -0.4840  (0.238) 0.0397  (0.066)
Dependent variable 1 lag * Union -0.1159  (0.108)  0.0468  (0.039) 0.0010  (0.010)
Dependent variable 2 lags * Union  0.0822  (0.110) _____ 0.0022  (0.009)
Dependent variable 3 lags * Union  0.1258  (0.081) _____ 0.0069  (0.007)
Dummy 1993 * Union  0.0061  (0.256) -2.7160  (1.458) -0.2094  (0.225)
Industry 31* Union * Dummy 1993  0.5619  (0.345) _____ 0.0190  (0.059)
Industry 32* Union * Dummy 1993 -0.1119  (0.156) _____ -0.1820  (0.053)
Industry 34* Union * Dummy 1993  0.3970  (0.220) _____ 0.0580  (0.060)
Industry 35* Union * Dummy 1993  0.1940  (0.243) _____ 0.1199  (0.051)
Industry 36* Union * Dummy 1993 -2.8014  (0.426) _____ -0.2880  (0.110)
Rel.wage blue-white * Union*Dummy 1993  0.2839  (0.497) _____ _____
Wedge * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  2.9352  (1.155) _____
Wedge 4 lags * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  0.4494  (0.363) _____
Alternative wage * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  2.0044  (0.856) _____
Employment composition * Union _____  0.1544  (0.289) _____
Product demand * Union * Dummy 1993 _____ _____ -0.0569  (0.097)Wage level * Union* Dummy 1993 _____ _____  0.4718  (0.162)
Rel.prices Uru/R of W*Union*Dummy 1993 -0.0186  (0.183) -0.9085  (0.378) 0.0442  (0.100)
Equivalent tariff  * Union * Dummy 1993  0.1316  (0.124) 0.0563  (0.202) 0.0081  (0.072)
Dependent var. 1 lag*Union*Dummy 1993  0.0368  (0.106)  0.0435  (0.148) 0.0017  (0.007)
Dependent var. 2 lags*Union*Dummy 1993 -0.0670  (0.108) _____ -0.0007  (0.007)
Dependent var. 3 lags*Union*Dummy 1993  0.0487  (0.086) _____ -0.0005  (0.005)
Note: Industries are: food, beverage & tobacco (31); textiles & leather (32); paper (34); chemicals &
oil (35); non-metallic minerals (36); metal products (38). Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
(White, 1980) are in parenthesis besides each estimated coefficient.
The estimated gaps are such that unionisation meant a higher wage level and a lower
employment level in the second half of the eighties, with no effect on the composition of
labour (Table 7.3). In the nineties, unions reduced the ratio of blue to white-collar workers,
generated an increase in the wage level but managed to protect against job loss (although the
magnitude of the effect is obviously overstated). The rise in the wage level is smaller than in
the previous period, in spite of the fact that reducing the proportion of production workers
leads to increases in the average wage. Both facts point at a different mechanism for wage
setting at work relative to the eighties.
Table 7.3 Estimated gaps
1985 - 1992 1993 - 1999
Employment mix 0- 3 %
Wage level  21% 6%
Employment level -22% 362%
Source: Table A.1 in the appendix
Since union differentials are calculated at the mean value of membership, their magnitude
varies by industry when the estimated coefficients are found to be statistically different in the
cross section. In the eighties, on average, the union/non-union wage differential is 21%. That
is, de-unionisation in manufacturing would have implied that wages were 21% lower than
what they actually were (implying an elasticity of 0.04). Since no effects of union on labour
demand were found, the employment differential is –0.22 (that is, the wage effect times the
wage elasticity of labour demand).
In the nineties, on the other hand, union effects are found also on the level and composition
of labour. The estimated gap for the employment mix is –3%. In reducing the ratio of blue to
white-collar workers, unions increase the average wage. However, other indirect effects and
their direct effect on the wage level determine that the wage differential in the nineties is
lower than before (6%). Regarding the employment gap its estimated magnitude is too large,however signalling at positive union effects on employment. This is possibly due to the fact
that there are too many sources of variation that are not properly accounted for in this simple
model.
The results, however, do support the existence of union effects in the Uruguayan case that
varied in the early nineties. Together with all the other evidence here reported, the
specification of two bargaining models - one for the eighties and one for the nineties – is in
place.
Results for the right-to-manage model: 1985-1992
The specification of the model follows equations (9) to (11). The estimation method used is
Instrumental Variables for each equation. Variables accounting for external shocks are the
indicators measured in quantities as described above. The ratio of imports and exports over
GDP for the whole economy is used to measure overall external shocks while import
penetration and exports share by industry are included to model competitive pressure on
firms at the sectoral level. The latter two variables are possibly endogenous to the model.
Hence the relative price Uruguay - Rest of the world is used as an instrument for both
variables, following the proposal in Abowd and Allain (1996). The equivalent tariff is used as
an instrument for the overall degree of openness, in spite of endogeneity of an economy wide
measure being more dubious than that of the other two variables. The methodology followed
consisted in specifying first an econometrically correct dynamic version of the models with
fixed effects by industry and an adequate set of instruments, starting with 4 lags for all
variables except those that are used as additional controls (unionisation, external shocks). All
control variables are included in the initial specification. In a second stage, the dynamics
were reduced and afterwards differences by industry in the estimated parameters were tested
for and included in the model when statistically significant. The fourth step consisted in
eliminating the control variables that were not significant so as to avoid possible collinearity,
especially among those related to competitive pressure. The final specifications are
summarized in Table 7.4
6. The results are consistent with those stemming from equations (5)
to (7), although the magnitude of the differentials is sometimes different.
                                                
6 The output of the initial estimated equations is included in Table A.2 in the appendix.The models show stability in the cross-section and in time. The homogeneity of the effect of
unions on wages among industries reflects the fact that bargaining was quite synchronised
and co-ordinated in the period. The estimated impact of union action on the average wage
level is such that complete unionisation in the period would have generated a 7% increase in
wages, evaluated at the mean value of union density (40%). This figure is smaller than that
found for blue-collar workers (22%) implying that one of the consequences of union action
was to increase the relative price of blue-collar workers with respect to the less unionised
white-collar workers. The result is consistent with unions reducing wage differentials and
inducing higher levels of substitution than would have taken place otherwise. Finally, the
estimated effect of union action on employment, via the wage elasticity of labour demand,
was to lower employment in –0.5% per each 10 percentage points increase in membership.
Given the mean value of union density in the period, full unionisation would have meant a
3% decrease in labour demand.
Table 7.4 Estimated models 1985 - 1992





Imports/Consumption -0.4715 (0.302) 00
Export share (industry) 0 0 0
Openness (economy) 0.6105 (0.288) 0.4269 (0.115) 0
Union density ____ 0.1085 (0.044) ____
Relative wage blue/white-collars -1.4393 (0.266) ____ ____
Blue/white-collars ____ -0.2447 (0.077) ____
Wedge ____ -0.7655 (0.170) ____
Alternative wage ____ 0.4037 (0.169) ____
GDP ____ ____ 0.4677 (0.245)
Wage ____ ____ -0.4245 (0.134)
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Note: The equations include binary variables by industry and per quarter. Standard errors are in
parenthesis besides the estimates (heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in the employment
equation). Tests statistics are reported with p-values in parenthesis below. A '*' means the hypothesis
is rejected at 95% confidence while if  '**' it is so at 99% confidence.
Bargaining at the firm level was not a generalised practice in the period (only 1% of workers
were covered by these contracts on average). However, the variable was included and no
statistically significant effect was detected by the data.
External shocks had an effect only on the wage level and the employment mix. The overall
increased openness of the economy promoted wage inflation, as it allowed the economy to
grow based on exports of primary and manufacturing goods to a protected regional market
(under regional agreements as CAUCE and PEC), in which wage increases could still be
passed on to consumer prices. The effect is however reduced since it also promoted a more
intensive use of non-production workers. Increases in import penetration, on the other hand,
generated the opposite, thus also pushing up average wages via the labour composition effect.
Consistent with previous findings, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is
below 1, and so is the output elasticity of labour demand. The partial elasticity of substitution
between blue and white-collar workers is large (-1.43, statistically equal to 1 at the 95%
confidence), indicating that firms were able to adjust their labour mix to changes in relative
pay without much resistance from trade unions. The result is not unexpected if trade unions
are not concerned about employment.
Results using a recursive contracts model: 1992-1999
The model for this sub-period is that stated in equations (12) to (14). The Instrumental
Variables method was used and the methodology followed was analogous to that stated in the
previous section. Results for the initial models are listed in the appendix (Table A.3) while
the estimated parameters of the final equations are summarised in Table 7.5.The estimated equations are not stable anymore in the cross-section. Union direct effects vary
by industry in all models. Further, in the model describing the composition of employment
the impact of import penetration is also different depending on the manufacturing sector. The
result can be associated to two phenomena. Firstly, bargaining stopped being a co-ordinated
process, with trade unions becoming a lot more independent from each other and less linked
to the central union. Secondly, increased openness and especially import penetration meant
different challenges for the diverse manufacturing activities.
Table 7.5 Estimated models 1992 - 1999







Imports/Consumption (industry) ___ 0 -1.109 (0.392)
Imports/Consumption*Ind.31 -2.914 (4.476) ____ ____
Imports/Consumption*Ind.32 -1.639 (0.797) ____ ____
Imports/Consumption*Ind.34 -10.656 (4.192) ____ ____
Imports/Consumption*Ind.35 1.007 (3.608) ____ ____
Imports/Consumption*Ind.36 1.554 (1.285) ____ ____
Imports/Consumption*Ind.38 -14.34 (4.056) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density ____ 0 1.787 (0.787)
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.31 9.745 (18.74) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.32 6.525 (4.050) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.34 38.81 (14.77) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.35 -1.610 (6.494) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.36 -27.01 (15.69) ____ ____
Imp./Cons*Union density*Ind.38 65.52 (19.12) ____ ____
Export share (industry) 0 -1.371 (0.576) 0
Export share * Union density 0 4.488 (1.986) 0
Union density*Ind.31 -1.450 (2.428) -4.028 (2.045) 1.0446 (0.829)
Union density*Ind.32 -3.760 (2.136) -6.435 (3.546) 0.3916 (0.899)
Union density*Ind.34 -12.88 (5.149) -2.4715 (1.396) -0.1934 (0.660)
Union density*Ind.35 0.6763 (3.239) -2.8078 (1.532) 0.5266 (0.941)
Union density*Ind.36 8.990 (6.942) -3.1035 (2.713) -1.7884 (0.955)
Union density*Ind.38 -60.05 (17.49) -2.8295 (1.722) -0.6964 (1.116)
Relative wage blue/white-collars -1.462 (0.302) ____ ____
Blue/white-collars ____ -0.694 (0.617) ____
Blue/white-collars*Union density ____ 5.234 (3.280) ____
Wedge ____ -1.88 (0.433) 0
Alternative wage ____ 0.9798 (0.243) 0.3402 (0.156)
GDP ____ ____ 0.3147 (0.174)
GDP*Union density ____ ____ -0.6866 (0.431)
Wage ____ ____ -0.3885 (0.157)
%Workers covered by firm-level -0.0671 (0.080) 0.0131 (0.100)  ____
%Workers covered by fla * Ind.31 ____ -0.2135 (0.125) -0.124 (0.130)
%Workers covered by fla * Ind.32 ____ 0.0131 (0.100) 1.031 (0.461)%Workers covered by fla * Ind.34 ____ 0.0131 (0.100) -0.5539 (0.153)
%Workers covered by fla * Ind.35 ____ 0.0131 (0.100) -0.7485 (0.301)
%Workers covered by fla * Ind.36 ____ 0.0131 (0.100) -0.0524 (0.058)
%Workers covered by fla * Ind.38 ____ -1.4149 (0.764) -2.555 (1.101)
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Notes: Industries are: food, beverage & tobacco (31); textiles & leather (32); paper (34); chemicals &
oil (35); non-metallic minerals (36); metal products (38). The equations include binary variables by
industry and per quarter. Standard errors are in parenthesis besides the estimates (heteroskedastic
consistent standard errors in the employment equation). Tests statistics are reported with p-values in
parenthesis below. A '*' means the hypothesis is rejected at 95% confidence while if  '**' it is so at
99% confidence.
Unions decrease the proportion of production workers in all industries except for chemicals
& oil
 7. One possible explanation for the result is that unions resist technical change towards
more skilled labour-intensive technologies. The estimated effect of import penetration is in
the same direction and a lot higher than in the previous period, thus further promoting
changes in the employment mix in order to compete with products that in the nineties were
originated mainly from the rest of the world instead of coming from regional markets.
                                                
7 A large public enterprise dominates this industry, so that a different result is not surprising, given it
has different rules than the private sector to hire and fire workers while workers are organised in a
quite strong union.However, interactions between union density and import penetration were also statistically
significant, so that unions managed to buffer the negative effects of imports on the
composition of employment. The overall effect on the employment mix is negative for all
industries, except for chemicals & oil (Table 7.6).
Table 7.6 Union effects on employment composition, wages and employment
by industry  1992 - 1999
Employment Composition Direct Indirect Total
Effect Effect via Effect Mean value of variables
Import
Penetration UD IP ES EC
Total manufacturing -2,19  2,16 -0,03 0.25 0.48 0.24 0.46
Food, beverage & tobacco -0,35  0,32 -0,03 0,24 0,14 0,25 0,44
Textiles & leather -0,72  0,70 -0,02 0,19 0,56 0,65 0,71
Paper -1,86  2,04  0,17 0,15 0,36 0,12 0,31
Chemicals & oil  0,36 -0,44 -0,08 0,53 0,52 0,16 0,28
Non-metallic minerals  0,76 -0,91 -0,16 0,08 0,40 0,15 0,54
Metal products -11,31 11,24 -0,07 0,19 0,91 0,14 0,48





Total manufacturing -0,81 0,25 0,53 -0,02
Food, beverage & tobacco -0,96 0,26 0,56 -0,14
Textiles & leather -1,23 0,21 0,45 -0,57
Paper -0,36 0,16 0,41  0,21
Chemicals & oil -1,50 0,59 1,18  0,27
Non-metallic minerals -0,26 0,09 0,17  0,00
Metal products -0,53 0,21 0,42  0,10




Total manufacturing  0,05 0,20 -0,16  0,01  0,10
Food, beverage & tobacco  0,25 0,21 -0,16  0,05  0,35
Textiles & leather  0,07 0,17 -0,13  0,22  0,33
Paper -0,03 0,13 -0,10 -0,08 -0,08
Chemicals & oil  0,28 0,47 -0,37 -0,11  0,28
Non-metallic minerals -0,15 0,07 -0,06  0,00 -0,13
Metal products -0,13 0,17 -0,13 -0,04 -0,13
Note: Union effects are calculated at the mean value of variables not in logs for each industry.
Means are reported under the heading of UD (union density), IP (import penetration), ES
(export share) and EC (employment composition).
Source: Table 7.5Regarding union impact on wages, the direct estimated effect is negative for all industries.
However, competitive pressure as measured by export share has also a negative effect on
wages that is buffered by union action. Further, unions were able to smooth the effects of
changes in the employment mix on wages, so that the total effect of unions on wages is
negative only for exporting industries (food, beverage & tobacco; and textiles & leather)
while it is nil for non-metallic minerals.
Unions have direct and indirect effects on the employment level via reducing the output
elasticity of labour demand as well as the negative impact of import penetration. The overall
effect, including that brought forth by the wage, is positive only for the exporting industries
and for chemicals & oil.
Given all the estimated effects, full unionisation (starting from 25%) would have meant, on
average, a decrease in the ratio of blue to white-collar workers and the wage of around 9%
and 6%, respectively, while increasing employment in 30%.
The extent of firm level bargaining has no significant impact on the composition of labour
(although the sign is also negative) but there are statistically significant effects on the wage
and employment levels for some industries. In Table 7.7 the total effects on the different
variables of the extent of coverage of firm level agreements is shown.
Table 7.7 Effects of the extent of coverage on employment composition,
wages and employment by industry 1992 – 1999
Employment
Composition Wage Level Employment Level Mean
Value
Direct Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
FLA EC Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect
Total manufacturing 0,10 0.46 -0.007 -0.005 -0.017 -0.022 -0.015 0.009 -0.006
Food, bev. & tobacco 0,10 0,44 -0.007 -0.021 -0.016 -0.037 0.000 0.014 0.014
Textiles & leather 0,08 0,71 -0.006 0.001 -0.013 -0.012 0.085 0.005 0.090
Paper 0,20 0,31 -0.013 0.003 -0.032 -0.030 -0.110 0.011 -0.099
Chemicals & oil 0,04 0,28 -0.003 0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.033 0.003 -0.031
Non-metallic minerals 0,19 0,54 -0.012 0.002 -0.030 -0.028 0.000 0.011 0.011
Metal products 0,01 0,48 -0.001 -0.017 -0.002 -0.019 -0.030 0.007 -0.023
Note: The effects are calculated at the mean value of variables not in logs for each industry, which are
FLA (extent of coverage of firm-level agreements) and EC (employment composition).
Source: Table 7.5While in food, beverage & tobacco wage increases are lower as the percentage of workers
covered by agreements signed at the firm level increase, no statistically significant effect is
found on the level of employment for that sector (yet the estimated effect is positive). The
opposite holds for paper and for textiles & leather, where no wage effects are statistically
different from zero but there are employment effects (negative for the former and positive for
the latter industry). Finally, wages in the metal products industry are lower and employment
higher than in the rest depending on the proportion of workers covered by firm-level
agreements.
All of the above points at different mechanisms at work in the various Uruguayan
manufacturing industries. The results of the models show that in the traditionally exporting
industries – food, beverage & tobacco; and textiles & leather – the effects of unions in the
nineties were to decrease the proportion of non-production workers and the average wage
level while increasing employment. Further, increases in the proportion of workers covered
by contracts signed at the firm level strengthen the union effects on employment (and on
wages in the former case). This behaviour would be expected if unions care and bargain over
employment in a context of re-structuring of firms that are in need to introduce new
technology and lower its costs.  Hence, what is probably taking place in these sectors is that
unions concern about job stability increased in the period and so did unions bargaining power
over employment.
Something similar takes place in non-metallic minerals. The total union effect on wages is
inexistent while the overall effect on employment is negative. However, wages go down and
employment goes up as firm level bargaining turns into a more common practice
8.
The case of chemicals & oil is different from all others since a public company dominates the
evolution of the statistics of the sector and workers cannot be fired except in very specific
cases regulated by law. Union effects on the employment mix are negative but they still
manage to significantly increase both wages and employment. However, if workers are
covered by agreements signed at the firm level, then the positive effects on employment are
reduced. This behaviour is consistent with that of a strong union that need not care much
                                                
8 Non-metallic minerals and paper are the manufacturing industries with a higher percentage of
workers covered by firm-level agreements by the end of the nineties (51% and 26%, respectively).about employment. It is also consistent with a union having similar bargaining power over
employment and wages.
Finally, the estimated effects of unions for the paper industry and for metal products, the
latter being a traditional import substitutive sector, are to increase wages and decrease
employment levels.  The sign of the effect of firm level bargaining indicates that
decentralised negotiations would revert the effects on wages. Their behaviour is thus that of
unionised sectors in which centralised negotiations are carried out with higher bargaining
power over wages and low concern on job stability, while decentralised bargaining would be
a mechanism that tries to adequate the centralised agreements to the firm's specific situation.
Conclusions
Enough evidence was shown in this paper supporting the idea that two different bargaining
models are needed to well describe the behaviour of the Uruguayan manufacturing firms after
1985. The contents of the collective agreements signed as well as the econometric models
estimated point at a right-to-manage model as the adequate instrument for the eighties and at
a recursive bargaining model for the nineties. Unions have changed their objective function,
augmenting their concern about job stability. Unions and firms have changed also the
mechanisms through which wages and employment are set. While firms decided the level of
employment in the eighties unilaterally, they became involved in negotiations with trade
unions in the nineties. It is not possible to determine if bargaining over both items took place
simultaneously or sequentially, but there is no doubt that union effects on employment were
present in the second sub-period. They are, however, different by industry, thus showing that
the synchronised and co-ordinated action of unions that predominated in the eighties no
longer holds in the nineties.
As a consequence, the channels through which unions act are different in both time periods.
In the late eighties, strong unions that bargained at the industry level only over the wage
managed to get a higher proportion of the extra rents. In the nineties, when no protection was
possible anymore and with a declining membership in a context of increased unemployment,
unions started bargaining at a more decentralised level and negotiations also included
employment and work conditions. Unions were able to guarantee job stability up to some
extent using different mechanisms in some industries. First, by moderating their wage
demands or even allowing wages to fall. Second, by buffering the negative impact ofincreased openness - especially that reflected in a larger amount of imported goods - and that
of changes in the composition of employment. Third, by smoothing the effect of demand
fluctuations on employment.
Import penetration has been substantial all along the period under analysis but especially in
the nineties. The common external rate for the countries in the Mercosur meant that imports
from the rest of the world increased sharply while Uruguayan exports to the region also rose.
Manufacturing firms were forced to move towards more skilled-labour/capital intensive
technologies and to reduce costs. This phenomenon is reflected in the models as increases in
imports generate reductions in the ratio of production to non-production workers, in the level
of employment and indirectly in wage levels, while stronger competitive pressure via exports
also decreases wage levels.
Decentralised bargaining started being a common practice in the late nineties. This has had
an impact on employment, employment mix and wages reinforcing or smoothing the
previous effects of union action.
Finally, while a model for all industries is adequate to describe bargaining in the eighties, the
empirical evidence shows that the various manufacturing industries have experienced
different processes in the nineties, so that instability in the cross section has been a constant
in the empirical models estimated. Interestingly enough exporting industries and the sector
dominated by a publicly owned firm have quite clear-cut behaviours. Unions in exporting
industries are concerned about employment more than the rest, so that they are willing to
accept lower relative wage increases. The industry to which a large publicly owned firm
belongs got both wages and employment increases due to union action, resembling the
behaviour predicted by an efficient contracts model.
More work need to be done to properly take into account all the various phenomena that have
taken place in the last decade. Research for each sector is in place given the heterogeneity
found and the use of micro data would help to eliminate possible biases in the estimates.
More important still would be to analyse the effects of union action on other indicators of
firm performance, such as profitability, investment rates or productivity. Appendix








Constant  0.1367 (0.070) -0.6459 (0.859)  0.5652 (0.210)
Quarter 1 -0.0134 (0.004) -0.0308 (0.007) -0.0005 (0.003)
Quarter 2 -0.0010 (0.004) -0.0043 (0.007)  0.0014 (0.003)
Quarter 3  0.0009 (0.004) -0.0046 (0.007) -0.0067 (0.002)
Industry 31  0.2109 (0.121) -0.0715 (0.049)  0.0087 (0.016)
Industry 32  0.0368 (0.031) -0.3507 (0.153)  0.0135 (0.009)
Industry 34 -0.0205 (0.038)  0.3773 (0.152) -0.0005 (0.011)
Industry 35  0.0007 (0.086)  0.1180 (0.119) -0.0262 (0.016)
Industry 36  0.0629 (0.025) -0.0597 (0.045) -0.0018 (0.019)
Dummy 1993 -0.0103 (0.025) _____ _____
Industry 31* Dummy1993 -0.2619 (0.128) _____ _____
Industry 32* Dummy1993  0.3719 (0.043) _____ _____
Industry 34* Dummy1993 -0.1492 (0.065) _____ _____
Industry 35* Dummy1993 -0.1617 (0.131) _____ _____
Industry 36* Dummy1993  0.1849 (0.045) _____ _____
Relative wage blue-white collars -0.2503 (0.130) _____ _____
Wedge _____ -0.9134 (0.269) _____
Wedge 4 lags _____ -0.1445 (0.226) _____
Alternative wage _____  0.5795 (0.337) _____
Employment composition _____  1.1193 (0.569) _____
Product demand _____ _____  0.0809 (0.038)
Wage level _____ _____ -0.1003 (0.055)
Relative prices Uruguay/Rest World  0.0133 (0.047)  0.0614 (0.097) -0.0188 (0.017)
Equivalent tariff  0.0107 (0.037)  0.0675 (0.072) -0.0046 (0.023)
Dependent variable 1 lag  0.5105 (0.064)  0.4519 (0.110)  0.7461 (0.059)
Dependent variable 2 lags -0.0326 (0.072) _____ -0.0124 (0.071)
Dependent variable 3 lags  0.1099 (0.061) _____  0.1633 (0.056)
Union density -0.0265 (0.170)  7.2961 (3.248) -0.4293 (0.319)
Industry 31 * Union -0.4749 (0.285)  0.1733 (0.138) _____
Industry 32 * Union  0.0178 (0.078)  1.2924 (0.566) _____
Industry 34 * Union -0.0166 (0.113) -1.4731 (0.583) _____
Industry 35 * Union -0.0973 (0.143) -0.7833 (0.417) _____
Industry 36 * Union -0.1289 (0.102)  0.4738 (0.225) _____
Relative wage blue-white * Union -0.5802 (0.409) _____ _____
Wedge * Union _____ -0.0615 (0.556) _____
Wedge 4 lags * Union _____ -0.5609 (0.352) _____
Alternative wage * Union _____ -2.2747 (1.141) _____
Employment composition * Union _____ -5.2711 (2.273) _____
Product demand * Union _____ _____ -0.0400 (0.055)
Wage level * Union _____ _____  0.1483 (0.128)
Rel. prices Uru/R of W * Union -0.0097 (0.101)  0.0206 (0.211)  0.0614 (0.042)
Equivalent tariff  * Union -0.1430 (0.113) -0.4840 (0.238)  0.0397 (0.066)
Dependent variable 1 lag * Union -0.1159 (0.108)  0.0468 (0.039)  0.0010 (0.010)
Dependent variable 2 lags * Union  0.0822 (0.110) _____  0.0022 (0.009)
Dependent variable 3 lags * Union  0.1258 (0.081) _____  0.0069 (0.007)(Table A.1 continued)
Dummy 1993 * Union  0.0061 (0.256) -2.7160 (1.458) -0.2094 (0.225)
Industry 31* Union * Dummy 1993  0.5619 (0.345) _____  0.0190 (0.059)
Industry 32* Union * Dummy 1993 -0.1119 (0.156) _____ -0.1820 (0.053)
Industry 34* Union * Dummy 1993  0.3970 (0.220) _____  0.0580 (0.060)
Industry 35* Union * Dummy 1993  0.1940 (0.243) _____  0.1199 (0.051)
Industry 36* Union * Dummy 1993 -2.8014 (0.426) _____ -0.2880 (0.110)
Rel.wage blue-white*Union*Dummy1993  0.2839 (0.497) _____ _____
Wedge * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  2.9352 (1.155) _____
Wedge 4 lags * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  0.4494 (0.363) _____
Alternative wage * Union * Dummy 1993 _____  2.0044 (0.856) _____
Employment Comp.*Union*Dummy 1993 _____  0.1544 (0.289) _____
Product demand * Union * Dummy 1993 _____ _____ -0.0569 (0.097)
Wage level * Union* Dummy 1993 _____ _____  0.4718 (0.162)
Rel.prices Uru/RofW*Union*Dummy 1993 -0.0186 (0.183) -0.9085 (0.378)  0.0442 (0.100)
Equivalent tariff  * Union * Dummy 1993  0.1316 (0.124)  0.0563 (0.202)  0.0081 (0.072)
Dependent var. 1 lag*Union*Dummy1993  0.0368 (0.106)  0.0435 (0.148)  0.0017 (0.007)
Dependent var. 2 lags*Union*Dummy1993 -0.0670 (0.108) _____ -0.0007 (0.007)
Dependent var. 3 lags*Union*Dummy1993  0.0487 (0.086) _____ -0.0005 (0.005)








Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions
χ 2(nº of over-identifying restrictions)
_____ 3.6744 [0.159] 19.178
[0.014]*
Normality test (Jarque-Bera)























Testing all coefficients = 0  F[k,T-k]  or
χ 2 (k)    k = nº predetermined vars.




























Note: Industries are: food, beverage & tobacco (31); textiles & leather (32); paper (34); chemicals  &
oil (35); non-metallic minerals (36); metal products (38). Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
(White, 1980) are in parenthesis besides each estimated coefficient. 'Dummy1993' is equal to 0 before
1993.1 and equal to 1 afterwards. Tests statistics are reported with p-values in parenthesis below. A '*'








Constant  0.1245 (0.054)  1.1600 (0.809)  1.8913 (0.825)
Quarter 1 -0.0193 (0.008) -0.0566 (0.016) -0.0134 (0.009)
Quarter 2  0.0068 (0.008) -0.0118 (0.012) -0.0048 (0.007)
Quarter 3 -0.0012 (0.008) -0.0284 (0.019) -0.0123 (0.006)
Industry 31 -0.0578 (0.082)  0.189 (0.147)  0.1487 (0.091)
Industry 32  0.0071 (0.085)  0.4145 (0.225)  0.0676 (0.074)
Industry 34 -0.0805 (0.056) -0.0131 (0.118)  0.0345 (0.058)
Industry 35 -0.0813 (0.046)  0.0519 (0.093)  0.0068 (0.036)
Industry 36 -0.0264 (0.055)  0.0723 (0.128) -0.0229 (0.071)
Export share (industry) -0.0455 (0.123) -1.7206 (1.072)  0.2279 (0.258)
Import penetration (industry) -0.1287 (0.121) -0.3032 (0.593)  0.2124 (0.144)
Openness (economy)  0.0869 (0.137)  0.6256 (0.386) -0.1069 (0.102)
Employment composition _____ -0.1387 (0.323) _____
Union density _____ 0.3039 (0.833) _____
Export share * Union density _____ 2.2550 (1.838) _____
Import penetration * Union density _____ 0.9027 (1.289) _____
Openness * Union density _____ -1.0564 (0.863) _____
Employment composition * Union density _____ -0.5242 (0.963) _____
Relative wage -0.7503 (0.124) _____ _____
Relative wage 1 lag 0.3865 (0.148) _____ _____
Relative wage 2 lags -0.1786 (0.151) _____ _____
Relative wage 3 lags 0.2547 (0.141) _____ _____
Relative wage 4 lags 0.0783 (0.143) _____ _____
Wedge _____ -0.8605 (0.272) _____
Wedge 1 lag _____ 0.0892 (0.436) _____
Wedge 2 lags _____ 0.4146 (0.409) _____
Wedge 3 lags _____ -0.3450 (0.424) _____
Wedge 4 lags _____ 0.0734 (0.368) _____
Alternative wage _____ 0.7327 (0.403) _____
Alternative wage 1 lag _____ -0.7360 (0.537) _____
Alternative wage 2 lags _____ 0.2780 (0.597) _____
Alternative wage 3 lags _____ -0.4675 (0.480) _____
Alternative wage 4 lags _____ 0.1404 (0.230) _____
Employment composition _____ 1.1193 (0.569) _____
Product demand _____ _____ -0.0189 (0.180)
Product demand 1 lag _____ _____ 0.0066 (0.096)
Product demand 2 lags _____ _____ 0.0957 (0.052)
Product demand 3 lags _____ _____ -0.0573 (0.052)
Product demand 4 lags _____ _____ 0.1397 (0.097)
Wage level _____ _____ -0.1737 (0.136)
Wage level 1 lag _____ _____ 0.0696 (0.140)
Wage level 2 lags _____ _____ -0.0230 (0.098)
Wage level 3 lags _____ _____ 0.0864 (0.094)
Wage level 4 lags _____ _____ -0.1848 (0.085)
Dependent variable 1 lag 0.5171 (0.086) 0.6256 (0.386) 0.7818 (0.152)
Dependent variable 2 lags 0.0771 (0.096) 0.0791 (0.224) -0.1923 (0.210)
Dependent variable 3 lags 0.1209 (0.093) 0.2791 (0.206) 0.1403 (0.171)
Dependent variable 4 lags  0.0323 (0.100)  0.0350 (0.235) -0.1275 (0.204)(Table A.2 continued)








Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions













     12.486
[0.0019] **
Heteroskedasticity
  F[m, T-m]  m = nº restrictions
1.062
[0.3952]
     2.1445











Testing all coefficients = 0
χ 2 (k)    k = nº predetermined vars.
     5655.9
[0.0000] **
     1428.8
[0.0000] **
      44416
[0.0000] **
Instruments used


































Note: Industries are: food, beverage & tobacco (31); textiles & leather (32); paper (34); chemicals &
oil (35); non-metallic minerals (36); metal products (38). Standard errors are in parenthesis besides
each estimated coefficient (corrected following White (1980) for the wage equation). Tests statistics
are reported with p-values in parenthesis below. A '*' means the hypothesis is rejected at 95%








Constant  0.0353 (0.191)  0.2864 (0.652) -0.1006 (1.586)
Quarter 1 -0.1526 (0.240)  0.2838 (0.218) 0.0079 (0.018)
Quarter 2 -0.0366 (0.320)  0.3287 (0.312) -0.0031 (0.007)
Quarter 3 -0.1100 (0.118)  0.1610 (0.102) -0.0022 (0.009)
Industry 31 -0.1416 (0.096)  0.0336 (0.105) 0.0865 (0.217)
Industry 32 -0.0394 (0.110)  0.1865 (0.182) 0.0973 (0.288)
Industry 34 -0.0093 (0.007) -0.0230 (0.007) 0.1759 (0.212)
Industry 35  0.0009 (0.007) -0.0063 (0.005) 0.0591 (0.136)
Industry 36  0.0036 (0.007) -0.0078 (0.005) 0.1559 (0.226)
Export share (industry)  0.2796 (0.644) -0.5429 (0.468) -0.1276 (0.456)
Import penetration (industry) -0.2651 (0.283)  0.5803 (0.518) 0.1725 (0.422)
Openness (economy)  0.4707 (0.330)  0.0590 (0.651)  0.3117 (0.877)
Employment composition _____  0.3478 (0.317) _____
Union density  0.6713 (0.866)  0.5101 (1.862) 0.3682 (1.345)
Export share * Union density -0.4392 (0.527)  0.4691 (0.455) -0.0010 (0.277)
Import penetration * Union density  0.3618 (0.268) -0.8031 (0.854)  0.1629 (0.283)
Openness * Union density -1.0890 (1.209)  1.0095 (0.954) -0.4814 (1.893)
Employment composition * Union density _____ -1.2925 (1.362) _____
%Workers covered by firm-level contracts -0.2884 (0.148)  0.2074 (0.096) -0.0972 (0.248)
Relative wage -0.3928 (0.167) _____ _____
Relative wage 1 lag  0.0971 (0.173) _____ _____
Relative wage 2 lags  0.1936 (0.164) _____ _____
Relative wage 3 lags  0.0326 (0.160) _____ _____
Relative wage 4 lags  0.0160 (0.134) _____ _____
Wedge _____ -0.9412 (0.320) _____
Wedge 1 lag _____  0.6837 (0.431) _____
Wedge 2 lags _____ -0.4412 (0.648) _____
Wedge 3 lags _____ -0.0366 (0.431) _____
Wedge 4 lags _____  1.2644 (0.803) _____
Alternative wage _____ -0.1437 (0.236)  0.3789 (0.322)
Alternative wage 1 lag _____  0.7177 (0.373)  0.0101 (0.441)
Alternative wage 2 lags _____ -0.0808 (0.291)  0.0072 (0.230)
Alternative wage 3 lags _____ -1.0084 (0.562) -0.2351 (0.369)
Alternative wage 4 lags _____  0.1334 (0.176) _____
Product demand _____ _____  0.3609 (0.189)
Product demand 1 lag _____ _____ -0.1746 (0.109)
Product demand 2 lags _____ _____  0.0120 (0.067)
Product demand 3 lags _____ _____ -0.0558 (0.052)
Product demand 4 lags _____ _____ _____
Wage level _____ _____ -0.4159 (0.920)
Wage level 1 lag _____ _____  0.1076 (0.682)
Wage level 2 lags _____ _____  0.1298 (0.173)
Wage level 3 lags _____ _____ -0.1146 (0.148)
Wage level 4 lags _____ _____ _____
Dependent variable 1 lag  0.5308 (0.123)  0.6295 (0.132)  0.6964 (0.246)
Dependent variable 2 lags -0.1619 (0.093) -0.2966 (0.247) -0.0698 (0.225)
Dependent variable 3 lags  0.0480 (0.105)  0.0714 (0.136) -0.0065 (0.166)
Dependent variable 4 lags  0.0977 (0.082)  0.5263 (0.264)  0.3498 (0.149)(Table A.3 continued)








Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions































Testing all coefficients = 0
χ 2 (k)    k = nº predetermined vars.
     6654.6
[0.0000] **
6032.1
   [0.0000] **
      26260
[0.0000] **
Instruments used




























Note: Industries are: food, beverage & tobacco (31); textiles & leather (32); paper (34); chemicals &
oil (35); non-metallic minerals (36); metal products (38). Standard errors are in parenthesis besides
each estimated coefficient. Tests statistics are reported with p-values in parenthesis below. A '*'
means the hypothesis is rejected at 95% confidence while if  '**' it is so at 99% confidence.Bibliography
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